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Abstract
By mimicking the standard definition for a formal lan-
guage, we define what it is for a natural language to be
compact. We set out a valid English argument none of
whose finite subarguments is valid. We consider one by
one objections to the argument's logical validity and then
dismiss them. The conclusion is that English—and
any other language with the capacity to express the
argument—is not compact. This rules out a large class of
logics as the correct foundational one, for example any
sound and complete logic, and in particular first-order
logic. The correct foundational logic is not compact.
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Logic must underwrite the validity of valid arguments and the invalidity of invalid ones. It must
respect facts about which sentences logically follow from others. Graham Priest is surely right
to call this employment of logic its ‘canonical application’.1 So much is agreed on all hands.
But which logic best carries out the task?
A key metalogical difference between logics such as propositional and first-order logic on
the one hand and second-order logic or typical infinitary logics on the other is that the former
are compact whereas the latter are not.2 Recall that if Γ is any set of sentences of a logic, δ any
sentence in its language, and ⊨ is the logic's consequence relation, we may characterise the
logic's compactness as follows:
If Γ⊨ δ then Γfin⊨ δ for some finite subset Γfin of Γ
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Now compactness is defined for formal languages equipped with a consequence relation.
English, not being a formal language, is not usually considered to be compact or non-compact.
But the notion of compactness is easily extended to English and any other natural language.
Taking our cue from the formal definition, say that English consequence is compact just
when: for any set S of English sentences and any English sentence s, if S entails s then some
finite subset of S entails s. Or to put it another way, any valid argument of English has a valid
finite subargument.3 This raises a natural question: is English consequence compact or non-
compact?
Our article answers this question. We think it's of the utmost importance for the philosophy
of logic—for applied logic, more specifically—that the question be answered clearly and, if at
all possible, conclusively. This will be our aim: to show in detail and as decisively as philosophi-
cal argumentation allows that English is non-compact.
Before we present the argument, we must explain the notion of a foundational logic. An
analogy will be useful. Pure mathematics investigates many different geometries: Euclidean
planar, three-dimensional and higher-dimensional; spherical; hyperbolic; and many more.
Physicists and applied mathematicians, in contrast, are concerned with a small subset of these:
the geometries compatible with physical laws. Indeed, many physicists want to know how phys-
ical spacetime is actually structured, not just how it could be structured compatibly with the
physical laws. So one can ask which of the many available geometries models that of actual
space or spacetime. As has been recognised since Einstein (1921), indeed for decades prior, that
is a question for physics rather than mathematics. Similarly, what we might call pure logicians
investigate a variety of logics. The applied logician wants to know what the logic of our lan-
guage is, and this is what we call the foundational logic. Pure logicians tend to be mathemati-
cians and applied logicians philosophers (but not exclusively so).
Over the first half of the 20th century, first-order logic emerged as logicians' and mathemati-
cians' foundational logic of choice.4 Although first-order logic has been challenged as the foun-
dational logic, it remains the default such logic in the sense that no candidate has garnered
sufficient support to overthrow it and metatheoretic investigations almost always take place in
a first-order system (often a first-order set theory) or some informal rendering of it. First-order
logic is uncontroversially part of the correct foundational logic, and any extension of it only
controversially so. Our argument will show that the foundational logic cannot be compact so in
particular cannot be first-order logic.
The interest in the question of English's compactness largely stems from its upshot for our
choice of foundational logic: the logic that best underwrites logical consequence in English. We
therefore need some understanding of English consequence in order to be clear on the target
phenomenon. It is difficult to make a choice here while remaining dialectically neutral. If we
assume from the start that English consequence includes instances requiring second-order or
infinitary resources or if we assume that certain quantifiers are logical, then it can be a short
step to showing that English is non-compact. We will be careful to presuppose only (relatively)
uncontroversial characteristics in our account of English consequence.
First, when we first introduce students to logic, we say that validity is a matter of the impos-
sibility of true premises and false conclusion. And the thought that validity includes necessary
truth-preservation has been a dominant one in the history of writing on logical consequence.5
Of course, necessary truth-preservation is rarely taken to be identical to English consequence,
and the most popular extra ingredient is that validity holds in virtue of form. The most impor-
tant aspect of form is an account of the logical constants: the expressions whose interpretation
is held fixed when we determine the form of a sentence. Again, it is difficult to take a position
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on the logical constants without begging the question in favour of one logic or other. If the
logical constants include quantifiers such as ‘there exist uncountably many’, then the
non-compactness of English is inevitable. We will not invoke any assumptions about the logical
constants here, but be led to conclusions about them by our discussion.
1 | THE ARGUMENT
For ease of reference, we call the following argument, which has appeared in different guises in
the literature on compactness, A:
There is at least one planet.
There are at least two planets.
..
.




There are infinitely many planets.
Here ‘n’ ranges over English numerals: ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, ..., ‘one million’, ‘one mil-
lion and one’, and so on.6 Argument A seems valid, and evidently no finite subset of its pre-
mise set entails its conclusion. It seems to follow that English consequence is non-compact. The
moral carries over to any natural language into which the argument is translatable. If A is valid
so that natural-language consequence is non-compact, it follows that first-order logic (FOL),
which, as is well known, is compact, cannot be the correct foundational logic. The same goes
for any compact logic. And as is also well known—and a consequence of compactness—A 's
conclusion is not formalisable by any sentence of FOL, otherwise A 's first-order formalisation
would be a valid FOL-argument none of whose subarguments with finite premise sets is valid.
Other philosophers have argued that an argument along A 's lines witnesses English's non-
compactness; see for example Boolos (1975, p. 49) and Oliver and Smiley (2013, p. 238). Cham-
pions of second-order logic such as Boolos will of course take A to be valid, since it is
formalisable as a valid second-order argument. Champions of plural logic such as Oliver and
Smiley (and Boolos) would likewise also regard A as valid. Moreover, the literature does not, so
far as we know, contain any overt resistance to the idea that an argument such as A is valid.
What these and other champions of second-order or plural logic have in common, however, is
that they more or less lay down the validity of natural-language arguments such as A that are
formalisable in second-order logic or plural logic but not first-order logic. They do not justify
the claim that these specific arguments are logically valid in a detailed and direct way; their
validity falls out only as part of a much broader and more theoretical argument that second-
order logic or plural logic is logic.7
Although we too take A to be valid, we believe that this conclusion must be justified with
the utmost care and caution, and if possible without invoking controversial theoretical assump-
tions in the philosophy of logic. That's something that has not been done before, and our aim is
precisely to fill this lacuna. To this end, we will work on behalf of our opponents. We set out
the most plausible objections to A 's validity we can think of; and then we answer them. We
frame the discussion as an objection to first-orderism, defined as the thesis that first-order logic
is the correct foundational logic. This is for two reasons: first-order logic is compact, so can
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stand proxy for any compact logic; and, as indicated, it is a baseline logic, in the sense that no
one seriously doubts that at least first-order logic is required to capture the validity of English
argumentation.8
Resistance to A 's validity may take one of four forms. The first is to question whether
English has infinitely many sentences. The second is to question whether A is really logically
valid or valid only in some weaker sense. The third form of dissent is to maintain that A can
only be understood under some finite description. The fourth and final objection is to query
whether there is a determinate notion of English consequence. We take these objections in
turn, and rebut each of them. Our conclusion will be that A is valid. This shows that English is
not compact; in particular, it sinks first-orderism.
2 | THE FINITUDE OBJECTION
Does English really consist of infinitely many sentences? It has a finite lexicon (vocabulary), it
only allows sentences of finite length, and in practice only sentences shorter than some finite
length will ever be uttered, written or understood. So one might object that A is not really an
argument of English, since its premise set contains sentences of longer length than any finite
bound. In which case, it would follow that English is compact, since the consequence relation
of any language with finitely many sentences is trivially compact. As a consequence, the A
-based objection to first-orderism runs aground; there is no such argument upon which to base
the objection.
Our response to the finitude objection is threefold. The first is that the finitude objection sits
ill with the idea that the correct foundational logic is at least FOL. If you think there are only
finitely many natural-language sentences, a finite fragment of FOL will suffice to model these
sentences' implicational structure. The correct logic will then be this finite fragment of FOL,
not FOL itself. And it will not do to suppose that a finite fragment of FOL does the job but that
it's simpler to pretend that it's FOL for most intents and purposes. It's extremely simple to
define restrictions of FOL whose sentences are all shorter than some upper bound.
Second, our best theory of logical consequence should apply not just to current natural
language but to its possible extensions. Natural languages accrue words by the day, and those
without a written record shed them too. In a few years, English will have acquired sentences
it cannot express today, just as the sentence ‘I can't play my DVD on my laptop’ would have
been incomprehensible to Victorians. No logician worth her salt is interested in giving an
account of logical consequence that is valid merely for a precise moment in time. Further-
more, even if natural languages were set in stone and no longer subject to change, they could
have been different from what they are. Just as a meteorite crashing on Earth in 1901 might
have prevented us from ever adding the words ‘DVD’ and ‘laptop’ to English, so future natu-
ral languages could be different from how they in fact turn out. As applied logicians, our
interest should be not in any particular natural languages but in their possible extensions. It
is scarcely contestable that these include infinitely many sentences. Incontrovertibly, at least
some of them can express argument A.
Finally, observe that linguists, philosophers, psychologists and other theorists of language
conceive of actual natural languages as made up of infinitely many sentences.9 These sen-
tences are of finite, but arbitrary, length; hence there are infinitely many of them. More pre-
cisely, the set of natural-language sentences is usually specified by a set of recursive
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procedures, which generate sentences of arbitrary length. For example, all the following are
sentences of English:
Your grandparents were tall;
Your great-grandparents were tall;
Your great-great-grandparents were tall;
…
Now as a matter of empirical fact, there is some finite number N such that you do not have
any greatN-grandparents (which N is the least such may be vague). But that does not affect the
point that the infinitely many listed sentences are bona fide sentences of English.
In sum, the finitude objection conflicts with a foundational assumption in the study of lan-
guage. It also sits ill with our starting point of FOL and the philosophical logician's proper task
of accounting for logical relations in extensions of English. For these reasons, we find the fini-
tude objection particularly unpromising. Let us turn to a different attempt to block our objec-
tion that English is compact based on A's validity.
3 | THE MATHEMATICAL VALIDITY OBJECTION
For argument A to witness English's non-compactness, it must be a logically valid argument. If
it is valid only in some weaker sense, then it fails to make the antecedent of compactness
true,10 and so fails as a counterexample. There are of course many kinds of non-logical validity,
for example metaphysical validity or mathematical validity. Here is an example of a metaphysi-
cally valid argument, on Kripkean assumptions: ‘The stuff in the glass is water; so the stuff in
the glass is H2O’. This argument is truth-preserving of metaphysical necessity but it is not logi-
cally valid, since the vocabulary on which its validity depends—‘water’, ‘H2O’—is not plausibly
logical. Similarly, the objection goes, the vocabulary on which the validity of A depends—‘one’,
‘two’, …, ‘infinitely many’—is not properly logical.
Clearly, A is at least mathematically valid. Failure to appreciate A's validity is a mathemati-
cal failing, in a way that failure to appreciate the validity of ‘The stuff in the glass is water; so
the stuff in the glass is H2O’ is not a mathematical failing.11 So might A be merely mathemati-
cally valid, and not logically valid?12
We take it that ‘infinitely many’ is the only plausible source of controversy here. For any
finite n, that there are at least n many planets is of course first-order definable (formalising ‘is a
planet’ as a predicate letter F), and we take it as uncontroversial that the correct foundational
logic is at least as strong as first-order logic. This needs to be first-order logic with identity, but
we also take it to be (virtually) uncontroversial that identity is logical. Certainly, all of the most
plausible criteria for logical constanthood, such as topic-neutrality and generality, apply to iden-
tity. So, if this objection is to get off the ground, it must be that the quantifier ‘there are infi-
nitely many’ is not a logical constant.
As noted at the start, we must be careful dialectically. Our argument is what we might call
‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’: we do not want to invoke a general criterion of logical con-
stanthood. To put it another way, we want to argue that A is logically valid on independent gro-
unds and thereby show that ‘there are infinitely many’ is a logical constant (as we ultimately
believe it is), rather than presuppose this fact to show that A is logically valid. So if we defend a
criterion for logical constanthood that ‘there are infinitely many’ passes, we risk begging the
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question in favour of English's non-compactness. Further, it would take us far beyond the scope
of this paper to provide an account of the logical constants. Fortunately, we do not have to.
A is mathematically valid, that is, valid assuming the mathematical fact that to be infinite is
to be at least as great as 1, at least as great as 2, …, at least as great as n, …. Our claim is that A
is also logically valid, and the objection is that it is mathematically but not logically valid. To
vindicate our claim, we must exploit a well-known fact about mathematical validity, appreci-
ated by logicians. This is the fact that mathematically valid arguments may be turned into logi-
cally valid arguments from an appropriately specifiable set of mathematical axioms.
All present or recent work in mathematical logic provides evidence for this fact, which
is of a broadly inductive nature. What the past hundred-plus years have shown is that there
are no irreducibly mathematical steps in argumentation. Mathematical experience teaches
that mathematically valid arguments may be turned into logically valid arguments from a
set of mathematical axioms relevant to the domain in question. For example, the truths of
arithmetic follow logically from the axioms owed to Dedekind and named after Peano;
those of analysis from the axioms characterising a complete ordered field; those of group
theory from the axioms of group theory plus relevant supplementations in a given context
(e.g., that a group is abelian or finite); likewise for truths of geometry, topology, set theory,
and so on. All branches of mathematics have been axiomatised in such a way that a mathe-
matically valid argument—a mathematical proof—may be cast as a logically valid argu-
ment from a set of mathematical axioms that applies to the branch (or branches) in
question.
There remains room for disagreement about the logic in which mathematical arguments
may all be cast. That is, about how to interpret the word ‘logical’ in the uncontroversial equa-
tion ‘mathematical validity = logical validity from mathematical axioms’. First-orderists take
the relevant logic to be first-order logic: they believe that all mathematical proofs may be
converted into first-order proofs from mathematical axioms. The conviction that this can always
be done is what various authors, starting with Barwise (following a suggestion of Martin Davis),
have called ‘Hilbert's Thesis’.13 Naturally, to make this a substantive thesis, there must be some
implicit constraints on which mathematical axioms are to be used. It will not do simply to add
the conclusion as a premise every time. The axioms in a given branch must at least be held con-
stant. It is difficult to spell out exactly what an appropriate axiomatisation is, but it is quite easy
to recognise one in practice—just look at the countless formalisations logicians have produced
of mathematical arguments.
As an illustration of Hilbert's Thesis, first-orderists contend that elementary set-theoretic
arguments, such as A, can all be turned into logically valid ones from the axioms of a first-order
set theory (e.g., ZFC). More generally, those who think the correct foundational logic is compact
(such as, but not limited to, first-orderists) will take the relevant logic to be compact. In con-
trast, second-orderists maintain that, at least in some instances, the relevant logic should be
second-order logic. To capture all the truths of arithmetic, they argue, we must use second-
order rather than first-order Peano Arithmetic. To capture those of analysis, we must use a
second-order system (or subsystem) of analysis.14 The mere statement of the axioms of topology
requires second-order resources. And so on.
Suppose then that you take A to be mathematically but not logically valid. It follows from
what we have said that A can be rendered logically valid by the addition of a mathematical pre-
mise or premises. Now this additional premise (or premises) must express in some way the idea
that to be infinite is to be larger than any finite size. So let us assume that P is such a claim
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(or a collection of claims to this effect). The argument A supplemented with the required extra
mathematical premise(s) becomes:
There is at least one planet.
There are at least two planets.
..
.





There are infinitely many planets.
Call this augmented argument AP.
The problem now is that the non-compactness argument may be rerun on the supplemented
argument AP . By assumption, AP is logically valid. Yet no finite subset of AP 's augmented pre-
mise set implies its conclusion, since the claim (or claims) P together with finitely many claims
of the form ‘There are at least n planets’ for finite n does not imply that there are infinitely
many planets. We are still left with an argument witnessing English's non-compactness. This
counterexample is not the original argument A but its supplementation AP.
To sum up the discussion: the objection we considered was that A is mathematically but
not logically valid. Plainly, A is mathematically valid. Now, mathematical experience shows
that mathematical validity is equatable to logical validity from appropriate mathematical
axioms. But any supplementation of A by appropriate mathematical axioms will turn it into an
argument that is logically valid but none of whose finite subarguments is valid. So we are still
left with a logically valid argument exemplifying English's non-compactness.
4 | THE FINITE DESCRIPTION OBJECTION
The third line of resistance is that we cannot understand argument A except via some finite
description. This description might be along the following lines:
The argument A consists of the premises ‘There are n planets’ for each finite
number n and the conclusion ‘There are infinitely many planets’.
What's really going on when we understand A , it is urged, is that we understand its finite
description. To appreciate A 's validity, we then reason in a finite way using this finite descrip-
tion. (Perhaps using set theory, arguing from the fact that, according to the argument, the set of
planets is of size at least as great as any natural number to the conclusion that this set is of infi-
nite size.) We thereby convince ourselves of A's validity using finite reasoning.
This third objection is a red herring. We grant its contention, which is that we understand
A via a finite description and convince ourselves of A's validity by finite reasoning. Coming to
appreciate A 's validity is clearly not an infinitary undertaking. That does not change the fact
that A is valid but that no finite subset of its premise set entails its conclusion. Arguments of
English may consist of infinitely many premises even if we must employ finite terms to charac-
terise them. A's status as a witness to English's non-compactness is unaffected.
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Logic as we understand it aims to capture implicational facts. It is not a theory of what we
understand when we grasp an argument's validity (or invalidity), or how we come to appreciate
such facts. Hence our preference for the term ‘implicational’ over ‘inferential’: we are interested
in what follows from what rather than what can be deduced from what.15 Whether A's premises
entail its conclusion is not, in other words, an anthropocentric question; it is a question about
statements and the relations between them. The finite description objection thus confuses an
epistemological fact (about how we convince ourselves of A's validity) with a logical one (about
whether the relation of logical implication obtains between premises and conclusion).16
5 | THE INDETERMINACY OBJECTION
The final line of resistance queries whether natural language has a determinate consequence
relation. According to this objection, there are only various consequence relations that
arise from looking at English through a particular theoretical lens; none is the correct one. The
above argument for the non-compactness of English assumes, falsely, that there is a determi-
nate notion: the English consequence relation. Logical pluralists all take this line; indeed doing
so seems tantamount to pluralism.17
Now logical pluralism has come under fire. We ourselves have given arguments against it
and defended monism elsewhere.18 But a more direct response is also available, which does not
presuppose monism. Any account of natural-language consequence from the perspective of a
particular logic ℒ will yield a theoretical account of English consequence. In effect, such an
account analyses or replaces the informal notion of consequence with the more precise notion
of consequenceℒ, the subscript indicating the way in which consequence is now being under-
stood. For example, a first-orderist such as Quine would take the notion of consequence to be
that of consequenceFOL—consequence as modelled by FOL. Take, then, the notions of conse-
quenceℒ and validityℒ as informed by logic ℒ. Is A validℒ or not?19 If yes, then on this concep-
tion English is non-compact, ruling out ℒ's identification with FOL. If no, an explanation is
owed as to why A appears valid despite its invalidityℒ. What form could such an explana-
tion take?
In response, one could try to deploy one of the first three objections, in sections 2–4 above.
But as we have seen, none of them succeeds. So we have yet to find a way to explain away the
appearance of A's validity. To simply say that A is invalid because it cannot be formalised in ℒ
may be chalked up as a reason to expand one's foundational logic(s) beyond ℒ. In particular, to
say that A's conclusion cannot be first-order formalised fails to explain why A appears valid; it
merely highlights a shortcoming of first-order logic.
6 | UPSHOT
We have seen no good reason to doubt that the argument A (or some supplementation of it)
witnesses English's non-compactness. Since only one counterexample is needed to refute a uni-
versal claim such as compactness, this shows that English is not compact. So no compact logic
can fully capture English consequence. We were careful to argue for this conclusion without
resting on any controversial assumptions about the nature of the logical constants. We assumed
only that first-order logic is part of logic and did not appeal to criteria of logical constanthood
such as topic-neutrality or generality. Our argument is consonant with such criteria, as
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developed by Tarski (1986) and Sher (1991) and in our own work (Griffiths & Paseau, forthcom-
ing), which in particular support the logicality of the quantifier ‘there are infinitely many’. But
it does not presuppose them.
Our discussion rules out much more than just first-order logic. It affects a large class of
logics, including any sound and complete one.20 We must look to the non-compact logics
instead.21
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17 Beall and Restall (2006), reviewed in Paseau (2007), and Shapiro (2014) articulate and defend different varie-
ties of pluralism.
18 Part I of Griffiths and Paseau (forthcoming).
19 We omit consideration of theoretical perspectives informed by ℒ according to which A is neither validℒ nor
invalidℒ, since this does not correspond to any live options in the literature. We also assume that the claim
that no finite subset of A ’s premise set entails its conclusion is unimpeachable, whatever one's logical
orientation.
20 Since deductions are finite, any sound and complete logic, in which the deductive relation mirrors semantic
consequence, must be compact.
21 This paper forms part of a talk presented at the Oxford Philosophy of Mathematics seminar, the Kurt Gödel
Research Centre in Vienna, and the École d'Été in St Flour (in French), all in the academic year 2017–18.
Thanks respectively to Dan Isaacson and Volker Halbach, Neil Barton and Sy Friedman, and Brice Halimi for
these invitations, and to the various audience members for comments. We are also grateful to Alex Oliver,
Tim Williamson and anonymous journal referees for further comments.
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